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Distributed Channel Assignment in Cognitive Radio
Networks: Stable Matching and Walrasian
Equilibrium
Rami Mochaourab, Bernd Holfeld, and Thomas Wirth
Abstract—We consider a set of secondary transmitter-receiver
pairs in a cognitive radio setting. Based on channel sensing
and access performances, we consider the problem of assigning
channels orthogonally to secondary users through distributed
coordination and cooperation algorithms. Two economic models
are applied for this purpose: matching markets and competitive
markets. In the matching market model, secondary users and
channels build two agent sets. We implement a stable matching
algorithm in which each secondary user, based on his achievable
rate, proposes to the coordinator to be matched with desirable
channels. The coordinator accepts or rejects the proposals based
on the channel preferences which depend on interference from the
secondary user. The coordination algorithm is of low complexity
and can adapt to network dynamics. In the competitive market
model, channels are associated with prices and secondary users
are endowed with monetary budget. Each secondary user, based
on his utility function and current channel prices, demands a set
of channels. A Walrasian equilibrium maximizes the sum utility
and equates the channel demand to their supply. We prove the
existence of Walrasian equilibrium and propose a cooperative
mechanism to reach it. The performance and complexity of the
proposed solutions are illustrated by numerical simulations.
Index Terms—cognitive radio; spectrum sensing; resource
allocation; distributed algorithms; stable matching; Walrasian
equilibrium; English auction; combinatorial auctions
I. INTRODUCTION
In cognitive radio settings, secondary users (SUs) are capa-
ble of adapting their transmissions intelligently [1]. Through
the detection of spectrum holes, the SUs can use the unoccu-
pied channels licensed to the primary users for communication.
This mechanism is called opportunistic spectrum access [2]
and corresponds to the interweave paradigm described in [3].
Generally, there exists a tradeoff between the optimization
of the secondary systems’ performance and the primary sys-
tems’ performance [4]. Our objective is to find an assignment
of the primary channels to the SUs taking into account both
secondary and primary user performances. For a survey on
channel assignment mechanisms in cognitive radio networks
please refer to [5]. Since a cognitive radio network is a
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distributed and less regulated system, we are interested in
channel assignment mechanisms which are implemented in a
distributed way. We study such mechanisms using matching
markets and competitive markets with indivisible goods.
Although the applications and solutions of the two market
models are conceptually different, there exist similarities be-
tween the two market models [6]. First, both solutions of the
market models lead to an assignment, which is in our case, an
orthogonal assignment of the channels to the SUs. Moreover,
both models assume autonomous and rational agents who are
able to decide locally between different alternatives. These
properties are favorable for distributed operation of the SUs.
Nevertheless, both models, rely on communication based on
binary decisions reflecting a proposal in stable matching or
a demand in competitive markets. Hence, the application of
the two models has practical implementation in cognitive
radio networks in which coordination can be achieved with
low communication overhead. In addition to their distributed
and low communication overhead properties, optimality of the
solutions of both frameworks within specified performance
regions make the application of these models attractive for
resource allocation in communication networks. We relate to
some of these works, after discussing the differences between
the two frameworks.
The differences between the two models are as follows:
Competitive markets use prices as means to coordinate the
demands (decisions) of the consumers to buy goods and are
updated by an auction mechanism to reach a solution. In
stable matching, on the other hand, no prices are involved
but the two sets of agents, i.e. SUs and channels, exchange
proposals based on preference relations of each agent within
the two sets. Through sequences of acceptances and rejections,
a stable matching is reached. In the competitive market model,
only the consumers’ preferences (utility functions) are needed.
In Section III, we further discuss the differences of the two
solutions for our cognitive radio scenario.
A. Application of Matching and Competitive Market Models
In two-sided matching markets [7], two sets of agents are
to be matched, corresponding to the SUs and the primary
channels. Each agent in one set has preferences over the agents
in the other set. A matching of the agents in the two sets is
stable when no pairs of agents prefer each other compared to
their current matching.
Matching market models for resource allocation in wireless
networks have been recently applied in several works. In [8],
2the framework of two-sided stable matching is applied for
resource allocation in wireless networks and its merits revealed
regarding distributed implementation and efficiency. Stable
matching for channel assignment in cognitive radio settings
has been applied in [9]–[12]. In [9] and [10], one-to-one stable
matching is considered where the utility of the secondary and
primary users are chosen to be identical due to the fact that the
SUs cannot obtain the performance measures of the primary
users. In this case, the stable matching of SUs to the primary
channels is proven to be unique. In addition, in [10] stable
matching is successfully implemented through opportunistic
CSMA techniques. Reference [11] applies the model in [10]
to interweave cognitive radio settings with identical utility for
secondary and primary users. While in [10], [11], the utility
of both types of agents are the same, in [12] the utility of
the primary users depend on the interference leakage from
SUs and the utility of the SUs are their achievable rates in the
primary channels. In this context, many-to-one stable matching
is applied.
Stable matching for channel assignment in a single radio
cell is applied in [13] where two-sided matching takes into
account the utilities of the users in the uplink and the downlink
transmissions. In [14], the stable matching framework is
applied for cross-layer scheduling in the downlink of a single
cell where the utility of a user is his sum rate and the utility
of the resources includes the user queue state of the buffer.
In the context of physical layer security, stable matching of
transmitter-receiver pairs to friendly jammer is proposed in
[15]. In [16], uplink user association in small cell networks
is considered using many-to-one stable matching as well as
coalitional games. The user utilities are based on quality of
service (QoS) and coverage aspects.
In competitive markets [17], also referred to as one-sided
matching markets [18], there exists a set of agents which want
to buy quantities of goods. The prices of the goods regulate
the quantities bought by the consumers and are adapted
depending on the demand and supply of the goods. The
Walrasian equilibrium is a state in which the demand equals
the goods’ supply. In order to reach a Walrasian equilibrium,
a price adjustment process is required. This process is related
to auction mechanisms and its advantage is the distributed
implementation aspect and the limited amount of information
exchange required between the users and the coordinator.
Competitive market models have found a few applications
for resource allocation problems in communication networks.
Please refer to [19], [20] for a discussion on these applications.
Also, for a recent survey on auction mechanisms for resource
allocation in wireless networks, see [21]. In cognitive radio
settings, auctions have been applied for distributed channel
assignment in [22]–[24]. In [22], repeated auctions in the
uplink of a secondary cell are proposed for the allocation of
the primary channel resources to the SUs. Distributed auctions
are studied in [23] for energy efficient channel assignment
in cognitive radios. Moreover, in [24], a distributed auction
mechanism is proposed to find optimal one-to-one channel
assignment to the SUs where CSMA mechanisms are utilized
to implement the solution.
B. Contributions and Outline
In this work, we consider a set of transmitter-receiver pairs
as SUs and each user seeks the assignment of a set of
primary channels. Our objective, formulated in Section III,
is to optimize both the secondary and primary users’ perfor-
mance through coordinated and cooperative distributed chan-
nel assignment. We assume that each primary channel can be
assigned to one SU while an SU can be assigned to multiple
channels. However, an SU is restricted to use a maximum
number of channels called quota which improves the fairness
in the channel assignment.
We propose a coordinated channel assignment (Section IV )
which exploits many-to-one stable matching. Here, we assume
that a coordinator exists which can communicate with the SUs.
We characterise in worst case the number of bits each SU has
to exchange with the coordinator in order to reach a stable
matching. In addition, we provide conditions under which the
stable matching is unique and primary user optimal. Our model
differs from the models used in [10], [11], by the following
two aspects: multiple channels are assigned per SU, and the
utility functions of the primary channels are different from the
utility functions of the SU. One main difference to [12] is our
application of stable matching in interweave cognitive radio.
For cooperative channel assignment, we study a competitive
market model with indivisible goods [25] in Section V. The
utility function of an SU is the weighted sum of his achievable
rate and the utility of the primary users whose channels
he is assigned to. We prove the existence of a Walrasian
equilibrium which maximizes the weighted sum-performance
of the secondary and primary systems. To reach the Walrasian
equilibrium through a cooperative mechanism, we exploit an
English auction algorithm from [26]. The cooperative mecha-
nism requires the exchange of L bit information between the
SUs. In comparison to auction algorithm studied in [24], our
mechanism is able to assign multiple channels to each user.
Numerical simulations are provided in Section VI before
we draw the conclusions in Section VII.
Notations: Vectors are written in boldface letters. Sets are
written in calligraphic font. |S| is the cardinality of the set
S. |c| is the absolute value of c ∈ C. The Q-function is
given as Q(x) = 1√
2π
∫∞
x
exp(−u2/2)du. The inverse of
the Q-function is Q−1(x). x ∼ CN (0, a) is a circularly-
symmetric Gaussian complex random variable with zero mean
and variance a. Pr(x) is the probability of an event x. R+ is
the set of nonnegative real numbers.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a set K = {1, . . . ,K} of secondary transmitters-
receiver pairs and a set of orthogonal channels L = {1, . . . , L}
licensed to primary users. Each secondary user (SU) wants to
use a set of channels for communication. The system model
is illustrated in Fig. 1.
We assume that the distributed assignment of the channels
to the SU can be done either using a coordinator or through
direct communication between the SUs. In the stable matching
model studied in Section IV, we assume the existence of a
coordinator which is connected to the SUs through low-rate
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Fig. 1: Illustration of the system model.
links. In Section V, we do not assume the existence of a
coordinator, but require that the SUs can directly communicate
with each other.
A. Secondary System Performance
An SU is allowed to access a set of channels if these are
detected to be idle. We assume a primary user (PU) operates in
a time-slotted fashion and starts transmission at the beginning
and for the duration of a time-slot. Each SU at the beginning
of the time slot is assumed to make a number N of sensing
observations in each channel l. The sensing problem of SU
k is the decision between two hypothesis on whether PU l is
active (H [l]k,1) or not (H [l]k,0). The two hyposesis correspond to:
H
[l]
k,0 : xl,k(t) = wk(t), t = 1, . . . , N, (1)
H
[l]
k,1 : xl,k(t) =
√
Plz
[l]
k sl(t) + wk(t), t = 1, . . . , N, (2)
where sl(n) ∼ CN (0, 1) is the transmitted signal of PU l, Pl is
the average primary transmission power, wk(n) ∼ CN (0, σ2)
is additive white Gaussian noise, and z[l]k ∼ CN (0, 1) is
the quasi-static block flat-fading channel from PU l to SU
k assumed constant during the time-slot.
Let f [l]k = Pr(H
[l]
k,1 | H [l]k,0) and d[l]k = Pr(H [l]k,1 | H [l]k,1) be
the false alarm and detection probability of the detector at SU
k, respectively. The access probability of SU k in channel l is
given as θ[l]k = (1− ϑ[l])(1 − f [l]k ) + ϑ[l](1− d[l]k ), where ϑ[l]
is PU l transmission probability.
After spectrum sensing, an SU can be assigned a channel
l if he detects that PU l is idle. The signal from secondary
transmitter k received at secondary receiver k on channel l is
y
[l]
k =
{
h
[l]
k
√
Pksk + g˜
[l]
k
√
Plsl + wk, PU l is active;
h
[l]
k
√
Pksk + wk, otherwise,
(3)
where sk ∼ CN (0, 1) is the transmitted signal, Pk is the
transmission power assumed to be the same in all channels, h[l]k
is the channel from secondary transmitter k to its receiver, and
wk ∼ CN (0, σ2) is additive white Gaussian noise. We assume
that Pk is fixed and equal for all SUs and define the signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR), used in the simulations, as SNR := Pk/σ2.
The average achievable rate in bits/s/Hz of SU k in channel
l can be formulated as
usuk (l) = (1− ϑ[l])(1 − f [l]k ) log2
(
1 +
Pk|h[l]k |2
σ2
)
+ ϑ[l](1− d[l]k ) log2
(
1 +
Pk|h[l]k |2
σ2 + Pl|g˜[l]k |2
)
. (4)
The first term in the summation above is the average achiev-
able rate when the PU is idle (also called opportunistic rate
[27]) and the second term corresponds to the achievable rate
on transmission simultaneously with the PU.
If an SU k is assigned the set B ⊆ L of channels, his
average sum-rate is then
usu-sumk (B) =
∑
l∈B u
su
k (l), (5)
where usuk (l) is defined in (4) and usuk (∅) = 0. In this work,
we introduce the following channel assignment constraint: The
maximum number of channels an SU k can be assigned to
is restricted to a maximum of qk ∈ N, called quota, and is
assumed to be fixed for each SU.
B. Primary System Performance
If channel l is assigned to SU k, then the performance of PU
l decreases in both probability of misdetection (1 − d[l]k ) and
interference Pk|h˜[l]k |2, where h˜[l]k is the channel from secondary
transmitter k to primary receiver l. Accordingly, we formulate
the utility function of a PU l as:
upul (k) = φl(1− d[l]k , Pk|h˜[l]k |2), (6)
where φl(x, y) ≤ φl(x′, y′) for x ≥ x′ and y ≥ y′. If no
SU is active in channel l, the interference-free utility of PU l
is upul (∅) = φl(1, 0). We additionally define self-matching of
channel l as
upul (l) = u
pu
l ≤ upul (∅), l ∈ L, (7)
where the value upul reflects a threshold for a QoS requirement
of PU l. This QoS requirement will be incorporated later in
the stable matching framework in Section IV.
Since the utility of a PU is largest without interference from
SUs, the region
Rpu = {(r1, . . . , rL) ∈ RL+ | rl ≤ upu1 (∅), l ∈ L}, (8)
contains all jointly achievable performances for the PUs. A
subset of Rpu, specified as
R˜pu = {(upu1 (a1), . . . , upuL (aL)) ∈ Rpu | al ∈ K ∪ {l},
al 6= ∅,
∑
a
l′
=k
l′∈L
1 ≤ qk, k ∈ K, l ∈ L}, (9)
does not contain the performance tuples in which a PU
operates alone, i.e., al 6= ∅ for all l, but only the performance
tuples of the PUs when SUs are assigned to them or when the
PUs are self-matched as specified in (7). Also, the region in
(9) takes into account the quota restrictions on the SUs. Later,
we utilize the definition of R˜pu to relate to existing efficiency
results for stable matching.
4III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Our objective is to find an assignment of primary channels
to the SUs through distributed mechanisms. Define the assign-
ment variable
x(B, k) =
{
1, B ⊆ L is assigned to SU k ∈ K;
0, otherwise. (10)
In addition, define the following set of assignment constraints:
x(B, k) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀B ⊆ L, k ∈ K, (C1)∑
B∋l
∑
k∈K
x(B, k) ≤ 1, ∀l ∈ L, (C2)∑
B⊆L
x(B, k) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ K, (C3)
|B|x(B, k) ≤ qk, ∀B ⊆ L, k ∈ K, (C4)
upul (k)x(B, k) ≥ upul x(B, k), ∀l ∈ B, ∀B ⊆ L, k ∈ K. (C5)
Constraint (C2) ensures that only one SU is allocated per chan-
nel,1 and constraint (C3) ensures that each SU is associated
with one subset of L. The user quota constraint is in (C4) and
constraint (C5) specifies a QoS threshold for each PU.
We will utilize the definition of the constraints (C1)− (C5)
to describe the coordination and cooperation mechanisms we
propose in this work.
A. Coordination Mechanism
Our first objective is to propose a low complexity coordi-
nation algorithm which matches the SUs to the PU channels
exploiting the existence of a coordinator. The SUs and PU
channels form two agent sets and each agent has a preference
over each agent in the other set. These preferences are accord-
ing to the utility functions defined in Section II-A and Section
II-B, respectively. For this purpose, we use many-to-one stable
matching (Section IV) as an assignment of the channels to the
SUs.
Generally, distributed implementation of stable matching
requires communication between one agent set and the other
in order to exchange proposals. In this work, we assume
that the coordinator receives proposals from the SUs and
accepts or rejects them on behalf of the PU channels. In order
to implement the coordinated stable matching algorithm, the
information which should be available at SU k is usuk (l) in
(4) for all l ∈ L and his quota qk, while the coordinator
needs the information of upul (k) in (6) for all l ∈ L and all
k ∈ K. The information upul (k) = φl(1− d[l]k , Pk|h˜[l]k |2) at SU
k requires the knowledge of the probability of misdetection
1 − d[l]k , which is known at the SU, and the interference at
the primary receiver l. Assuming time division duplex (TDD)
systems, the channel gain |h˜[l]k |2 from secondary transmitter k
to primary receiver l is almost identical to the channel gain
1We impose the orthogonality constraint on the channel assignment because
the frameworks we exploit from stable matching and competitive markets do
not take externalities [28] into account which would exist in nonorthogonal
assignments. In our context, externalities are the interdependencies of the
allocation of channels to some users on a given channel assignment to a
specific user. Settings with externalities are generally much more complex to
analyze, especially regarding the stability of distributed resource allocation
algorithms. Recent application of stable matching with externalities for user
association in small cell networks can be found in [29].
from primary receiver l to secondary transmitter k and can
be made available at the SU during channel estimation to
calculate the interference Pk|h˜[l]k |2. Having this information,
we assume that each SU k forwards upul (k) for all l ∈ L to
the coordinator in an initialization phase.
If the coordinator also knows the utilities of the SUs, usuk (l)
for all k ∈ K and l ∈ L, then the Hungarian method2 can be
applied at the coordinator to find an assignment which satisfies
(C1)− (C5). The advantage of stable matching, however, is its
flexibility to adapt to network dynamics and also to complexity
requirements. We discuss these issues in Section IV-B.
B. Cooperative Mechanism
The cooperative mechanism relies on direct communication
between the SUs and does not require the existence of a
coordinator as in the coordination mechanism. We consider the
optimization of both the secondary and primary performance
measures which is a multi-objective optimization problem.
One method for solving multi-objective optimization problems
is by optimizing the weighted sum of the objectives [31] which
can be formulated for user k utilizing resource set B as:
W (B, k) = λusu-sumk (B) + (1− λ)
∑
l∈B
upul (k), (11)
with λ ∈ [0, 1]. Here, λ is a parameter which can be used
to increase the priority of one objective to the other. If λ is
close to one, the secondary system performance is given more
importance in the optimization above than the primary user
performance, while if λ is close to zero, the primary system
performance is prioritized. The value of λ must be defined in
regard of the network specifications.
The integer optimization problem we are interested to solve
is stated as follows:
maximize
∑
k∈K
∑
B⊆L
W (B, k)x(B, k) s.t. (C1)−(C4).
(12)
The solution of (12) is a Walrasian equilibrium of an asso-
ciated competitive market with indivisible goods studied in
Section V. The Walrasian equilibrium can be reached through
a distributed English auction which we exploit to provide
a decentralized and optimal cooperative channel assignment
mechanism.
In order to implement the cooperative mechanism to solve
(12), each SU k must know W ({l}, k) for all l ∈ L, i.e., SU
k must know upul (k) in (6) for all l ∈ L, his utility function
usuk (l) in (4) for all l ∈ L, the weight λ, and also his quota
qk. Moreover, all SUs must have knowledge of a common
parameter α > 0 which will be used as a price incrementing
factor.
IV. MANY-TO-ONE STABLE MATCHING
We propose assigning SUs to the channels associated with
the PUs by a framework for which stability serves as solution
2The Hungarian method [30] is an algorithm that solves the fundamental
one-to-one assignment problem in combinatorial optimization. The many-to-
one channel assignment with quotas in (12) is a form of the generalized
assignment problem for which the Hungarian method can be applied when
qk-many virtual SUs with a quota of one are introduced for each SU k ∈ K.
5concept instead of optimality. In cognitive radios, where SU
access on channels is opportunistic and complex regulation
entities are commonly absent, a stable distributed assignment
process is favored. The applied framework involves a two-
sided matching market where a coordinator is acting on behalf
of the PU side to support the decision-making. We assume
that one primary channel l ∈ L is matched to one SU k ∈ K
while the latter can be assigned to up to qk primary channels,
where qk ∈ N is the maximum matching quota, see Section
II. This resource allocation is named college admission [32]
or hospitals/residents problem [33] in the stable matching
literature.
A stable matching is produced by a distributed process
that matches together preference relations of the primaries
and the secondaries over the other agents each. The order
of preferences is given by the strictly ranked rate utilities
in (4) and (6). In some cases, matching one agent with
himself (denoted as being unmatched) might be preferred to a
matching with other agents in the stable matching framework.
Therefore, we define the matching of SU k ∈ K to himself
as usuk (k) = u
su
l (∅) = 0 which means that the device does
not transmit on any primary channel. On the other hand,
matching a PU with himself should intuitively lead to the
utility upul (∅) = φl(1, 0) as in Section II-B, since the PU
occupies its channel l alone and no SU transmits in l. However,
we specify the utility of a self-matched primary channel to a
value upul , see (7), reflecting a threshold for a QoS requirement
of the PU. In doing so, a PU prefers being matched to a SU
if its own utility remains higher than the threshold and prefers
self-matching if matching with a SU does not guarantee QoS.
The coordinator is in charge of monitoring the QoS issues of
the PU in the stable matching framework.
A. Stable Matching Model
The stable matching problem is described by the tuple [8]
〈L,K, {upul }l∈L, {usuk }k∈K, {qk}k∈K〉, where L is the set of
primary channels, K is the set of SUs, upul and usuk are the
utility functions of the PUs and SUs given in (6) and (5). The
quotas qk are associated with the SUs.
Definition 1: A matching M is from the set K∪L into the
set of unordered family of elements of K ∪ L such that3
1) |M(l)| = 1 for every PU l ∈ L where M(l) = l if
M(l) /∈ K,
2) 1 ≤ |M(k)| ≤ qk for every SU k ∈ K where M(k) = k
if M(k) 6⊂ L,
3) M(l) = k if and only if l ∈M(k).
In Definition 1, M(l) denotes the matched SU of PU l or self-
matching and M(k) denotes the subset of PUs matched to SU
k or self-matching, respectively.
Definition 2: The matching M is individually rational if
there exists no PU l ∈ L for which upul (l) > upul (M(l)) and
no SU k ∈ K for which usuk (k) > usuk (j), j ∈M(k) [7].
Individually rational matching ensures that no user, primary or
secondary, would prefer being matched to himself than with
the current matching.
3Definition 1 is adopted from [7] despite the fact that our framework does
not fill an under-subscribed matching set with multiple copies of the self-
matched agent.
Definition 3: The matching M is blocked by the pair
(k, l) ∈ K×L if (i) upul (k) > upul (M(l)) and (ii) |M(k)| < qk
and usuk (l) > 0 or usuk (l) > usuk (l′) for some l′ ∈M(k).
Accordingly, a matching is blocked by (k, l) if these prefer
each other to their current matching.
Definition 4: A matching M is stable if it is individually
rational and not blocked by any pair (k, l) ∈ K × L.
There may exist several stable matchings. Let all stable
matchings lead respectively to the SU and PU performance
regions RsuSM and RpuSM ⊆ R˜pu, where R˜pu is in (9). Next,
we provide an algorithm which reaches a stable matching and
reveal its performance in these regions.
B. Distributed Implementation of Stable Matching
Algorithm 1 implements a distributed coordination mecha-
nism proposed in [34] to deliver a stable matching. Here, the
SUs start proposing to be matched with their preferred PU
channels (Line 2) and a low-complex coordinator responds on
behalf of the PUs (starting Line 3). The information needed
at the SUs and the coordinator prior to the execution of
Algorithm 1 is stated in Section III-A. In the given protocol,
SU k proposes to be matched to a channel l by sending
a message Ψk to the coordinator if k has not reached its
quota and prefers this channel it is not already matched with
(condition in Line 1). The message Ψk can be of ⌈log2(l)⌉
bits which is the length of the base-2 equivalent of l. The
coordinator reacts to the proposal by sending a one bit message
to an SU k to indicate acceptance or rejection. The coordinator
accepts SU k on a channel l (Line 7 and 8) only if the QoS
requirement of the PU is fulfilled (Line 4). Otherwise, the
coordinator rejects SU k (Lines 5 and 6). Also, in order to
reduce the total number of iterations of the algorithm, the
coordinator triggers messages to exclude selected SUs from
proposing to certain channels (Lines 9 and 10). Including the
rejection information in Line 6, these messages are of L bits
and indicate for each SU which channels he need not propose
to.
In Algorithm 1, each SU proposes at most once to be
matched with a specific resource. Thus, the worst case total
number of proposals by an SU to the coordinator is L.
Proposition 1: The worst case number of bits that is ex-
changed between one SU and the coordinator during Algo-
rithm 1 is L2 + L+
∑L
l=1⌈log2(l)⌉.
Proof: The term∑Ll=1⌈log2(l)⌉ is the total number of bits
needed to indicate the channel indexes in the L proposals from
the SU. L bits are needed in total to indicate the acceptance or
rejection from the coordinator to the L proposals from the SU.
The term L2 is due to L bit messages sent from the coordinator
to the SUs in Lines 9 and 10 of Algorithm 1.
The actual number of proposals by a single SU depends on his
quota and also on the matching of the channels to the other
SUs. If the quota of an SUs is small, then a few proposals
can be sufficient to reach the matching quota limit and stop
the SU from further proposals. Also, when several SUs are
already accepted on some channels, the number of channels
which an SU can propose to may decrease due to Lines 9
and 10 in Algorithm 1. In Section VI, we provide extensive
simulations on the average number of proposals from an SU.
6Algorithm 1 Distributed SU-proposing stable matching.
1: while some SU k ∈ K is under-subscribed (|M(k)| < qk
or M(k) = k) and maxl∈L,l/∈M(k) usuk (l) > usuk (k) do
2: Proposal by SU k: send out index l⋆ =
argmaxl∈L,l/∈M(k) usuk (l) of most preferred PU
3: Coordinator Response:
4: if QoS is ensured, i.e. upul⋆ (k) > upul⋆ then
5: if PU l⋆ is engaged to any SU k⋆ 6= k then
6: inform k⋆ on releasing engagement with l⋆,
giving M(k⋆) = {k⋆} if it was |M(k⋆)| = 1
and M(k⋆) = M(k⋆) \ {l⋆} otherwise
7: accept engagement temporarily; set M(l⋆) = {k}
8: inform SU k on approving the engagement, giving
M(k) = {l⋆} if k was unmatched (M(k) = {k})
and M(k) = M(k) ∪ {l⋆} otherwise
9: for all i ∈ K such that upul⋆ (i) < max{upul⋆ (k), upul⋆} do
10: eliminate preference on i (upul⋆(i) = 0) and disqual-
ify SU i from proposing to l⋆ (usui (l⋆) = 0)
Observe in the implementation of stable matching that
if new secondary users arrive to the network and propose
to the coordinator to be matched to a set of channels, the
coordinator can use Algorithm 1 with the initialization of the
current stable matching. In contrast, the application of the
Hungarian method necessitates the network wide optimization
problem to be solved again. Nevertheless, the stable matching
algorithm can be terminated at any time instance associated to
a desirable complexity level to retrieve an orthogonal matching
of resources to the SUs. Such properties of the algorithm make
it adaptable to changes in the network and also to specified
complexity or implementation requirements.
Initializing Algorithm 1 with unmatched SUs and channels
as M(l) = {l} ∀ l, M(k) = {k} ∀ k, the terminating state is an
SU-optimal stable matching which is weak Pareto optimal4 in
the set RsuSM according to [7, Corollary 5.9] but is the worst
stable matching for the PUs [7, Corollary 5.30]. Next, we
provide conditions under which our stable matching is unique
and also sum-performance optimal for the PUs.
Theorem 1: For qk ≥ L for all k, the stable matching is
unique and leads to the maximum sum performance point in
R˜pu defined in (9).
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
The result above generalizes the uniqueness result of one-to-
one matching in [9, Proposition III.1] to the case of many-to-
one matching.
V. WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM
In the previous section, we studied two-sided matching
where the SUs on one side are matched to primary channels
on the other. In this section, we study a market model where
only one entity is represented (SUs) but its utility is the
weighted combination of the utilities of the secondary and
primary users given in (11) in Section III. Contrary to the
4The set of all weak Pareto optimal points in a performance region R are
defined as [35, p. 14] W(R) = {x ∈ R | there is no y ∈ R with y > x}.
previous section, we now do not assume the existence of a
coordinator. However, we require that the SUs are able to
communicate with each other in order to find an assignment
of the channels which solves Problem (12). The mechanism
exploits the market model studied next.
A. Competitive Market Model
A competitive market with indivisible goods [25] is com-
posed of a set of consumers and a set of goods. The consumers
in our setting are the SUs in K and the goods correspond to the
primary channels in L. Here, we define the unit-less5 utility
function of consumer k using the utility function in (11) with
an additional restriction on his quota qk as follows
Uk(A) = maximizeB⊆A λu
su-sum
k (B) + (1− λ)
∑
l∈B
upul (k)
s.t. |B| ≤ qk.
(13)
The function above is called the qk-satiation of the weighted
sum-perfromance [25, Section 2].
Each good l has a price pl ≥ 0 which is in monetary
units and we assume that each SU is endowed with sufficient
amount of monetary budget which enables him to buy bundles
of goods. The unit-less net utility of SU k is
vk(B,p) := Uk(B)−
∑
l∈B
pl. (14)
Given the prices of the goods (primary channels) p =
(p1, . . . , pL), the demand correspondence of SU k is the set
of goods which maximizes his net utility:
Dk(p) = {A ⊆ L | vk(A,p) ≥ vk(B,p) ∀B ⊆ L}. (15)
Later in Algorithm 2 in Section V-B, we specify a method to
efficiently calculate the demand for each SU. The outcome of a
competitive market is a Walrasian equilibrium which specifies
the prices of the channels at which each SU buys the channels
he demands and no channel is bought by more than one SU.
Definition 5: [25, Section 2] A Walrasian equilibrium is a
tuple (p,X0,X1, . . . ,XK), where p ∈ RL+ is a price vector,
and (X0, . . . ,XK) is a partition of L, i.e., Xk ∩ Xj = ∅ for
all k 6= j, and ⋃Kk=0 Xk = L, such that (i) for each k ∈ K,
vk(Xk,p) ≥ vk(A,p) for all A ⊆ L, and (ii) the price of any
object in X0 is zero.
A Walrasian equilibrium exists if and only if the utility
function Uk in (13) satisfies [25]:
1) monotonicity: for all A ⊂ B ⊂ L, Uk(A) ≤ Uk(B),
2) gross substitutes condition: for any two price vectors p′
and p such that p′ ≥ p (the inequality is componen-
twise), and any A ∈ Dk(p), there exists B ∈ Dk(p′)
such that {i ∈ A | p′i = pi} ⊆ B.
The gross substitute condition implies that if an SU demands a
set of channels, and prices of some channels increase, the SU
would still demand the channels whose prices did not change.
Theorem 2: A Walrasian equilibrium exists in our setting.
5The utility function can be made unit-less by dividing the terms with their
associated unit of measure.
7Algorithm 2 Calculate demand Ak of SU k.
1: Input: prices p = (p1, . . . , pL); quota qk
2: Init: Π = {π1, . . . , πL} with πl = vk({l},p); Ak = ∅
3: sort Π in descending order to obtain Πsorted
4: set Ak as the first qk elements in Πsorted which are strictly
larger than zero.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
There is a direct relation between the solution of (12)
and the Walrasian equilibrium of the associated competitive
market model with indivisible goods [36]. The existence of a
Walrasian equilibrium ensures that the solution of (12) is iden-
tical to the solution of its linear programming relaxation [36,
Theorem 1.13] in which the integer constraint (C1) is replaced
by the convex constraint x(B, k) ≥ 0, ∀B ⊆ L, k ∈ K.
Next, we will describe the English auction which is the
price adjustment mechanism needed to reach the Walrasian
equilibrium.
B. English Auction
In the English auction [26, Section 5], if a channel is
simultaneously demanded by more than one SU then its price
is increased. The auction terminates when each channel is
demanded by at most one SU. This auction mechanism is
within the combinatorial auctions frameworks classified in
[21] and has been rarely applied in the context of wireless
communication due to their complexity. In the following, we
show that the steps required during the English auction in our
model can be calculated efficiently.
In order to perform the English auction, we first need to
efficiently calculate the consumer demand in (15). Afterwards,
we need to calculate the set of channels which are simultane-
ously demanded by more than one SU. This set is called the
aggregate excess demand. These issues are addressed in the
same order next.
The consumer demand in (15) seems at first sight hard to
solve since a search over all 2L subsets of L is needed. Note
that in [26] no method is provided to calculate the demand, but
is only assumed that the demand can be calculated efficiently.
This assumption is known under the existence of a demand
oracle. We show that the consumer demand in our case can
be solved in polynomial time with the number of channels
using a greedy approach. First, we need the following result.
Lemma 1: If pl > 0 for all l ∈ L, then Ak ∈ Dk(p)
satisfies |Ak| ≤ qk for all k ∈ K.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix C.
From Lemma 1, if the prices of each good are strictly larger
than zero, then a user demands at most as many resources as
his quota. In order to calculate the demand of an SU, we use
the following assumption to ensure that the best qk channels
of a user k are unique.
Assumption 1: For any price vector p > 0, and for all
consumers k, the net utilities satisfy vk({l},p) 6= vk({l′},p)
for any two goods l, l′ ∈ L.
Theorem 3: For given prices p > 0, Algorithm 2 finds the
consumer demand set which is the smallest subset of all sets
in Dk(p) defined in (15).
Algorithm 3 Calculate excess demand Z .
1: Input: demand A1, . . . ,AK
2: Init: Z = ∅
3: for l = 1, . . . , L do
4: for all k, j = 1, . . . ,K and j 6= k do
5: if l ∈ Ak ∩ Aj then
6: Z = Z ∪ {l}
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix D.
The complexity of calculating the demand of SU k in
Algorithm 2 requires a sorting algorithm such as Quick Sort
which requires on average O(L logL) comparisons.
Later, in the distributed implementation of the Walrasian
equilibrium in Section V-C, it is required that each SU reports
his demand set to the other SUs. If an SU knows all other SUs’
demands, he can calculate the excess demand set which is
composed of the channels simultaneously demanded by more
than one SU. First, we need the following definitions before
defining the excess demand set.
The requirement function of consumer k is defined as
Kk(B,p) := minA∈Dk(p) |A ∩ B|, (16)
and reveals the smallest number of elements in common
between B and the demanded channels by SU k at given prices
p. From [26, Theorem 2], we have Kk(B,p) ≤ Kk(B, q) for
p ≥ q (componentwise inequality) and pl = ql for l ∈ L \ B.
This means that Kk(B,p) decreases when the prices of the
objects inside B increase.
Since the demand from Algorithm 2 is the smallest subset of
all demand sets following Theorem 3, we have the following
result:
Corollary 1: The requirement function can be calculated as
Kk(B,p) = |Ak(p) ∩ B|, where Ak(p) is the demand set
calculated using Algorithm 2.
Define the function which counts the number of times each
channel in B is demanded as
KK(B,p) :=
∑K
k=1
Kk(B,p). (17)
From [26, Corollary of Theorem 3], a necessary condition that
any channel in set B is not demanded by more than one SU
at the same time is KK(B,p)− |B| ≤ 0. Hence, in Walrasian
equilibrium with prices p∗, it must hold KK(B,p∗)−|B| ≤ 0
for all B ⊆ L. Define
O(p) := {A ⊆ L | KK(A,p)− |A| ≥ KK(B,p)− |B|,
for all B ⊆ L}, (18)
which collects the set of channels B ∈ O(p) that maximize
KK(B,p)− |B|. The excess demand set Z(p) is the smallest
element of O(p) and can be calculated using Algorithm 3 by
checking whether each channel is simultaneously demanded
by more than one SU. Algorithm 3 requires in worst case LK
calculations.
Theorem 4: For given prices p, Algorithm 3 finds the
excess demand set Z(p).
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix E.
8Algorithm 4 Implementation of Walrasian Equilibrium by
modified English Auction.
1: Input: price incrementing factor α > 0
2: Init: p(0)l = ǫ, l ∈ L; t = 0
3: repeat
4: Each SU k calculates A(t)k using Algorithm 2 and
broadcasts it to all SUs
5: Each SU calculates Z(p(t)) using Algorithm 3
6: Each SU updates the prices as
p(t+1) = p(t) + αδ(p(t)) (19)
with δi(p(t)) =
{
1, i ∈ Z(p(t));
0, otherwise
7: t = t+ 1
8: until Z(p(t−1)) = ∅
C. Distributed Implementation of Walrasian Equilibrium
The English auction, proposed in [26] and proven to reach
a Walrasian equilibrium, can be implemented by an auctioneer
(coordinator) which, upon collecting the demands from all the
users, updates the prices and broadcasts them to the SUs. How-
ever, since we do not assume the existence of a coordinator
in this section, we formulate a cooperative implementation
based on the SUs exchanging the channel demands between
themselves. Instead of updating the prices at the auctioneer,
each SU can update the prices locally knowing the demands
of all SUs. In Algorithm 4, we provide an implementation
of this mechanism. As in the stable matching coordination in
Section IV, the SUs need only communicate the indices of the
channels they demand. Thus, given L channels, each SU needs
to send L bits of information to the other SUs to reveal his
demand. Specifically, SU k sends the L bit message Ψk to the
other SUs with [Ψk]l = 1 if l ∈ Ak and [Ψk]l = 0 otherwise.
Given the demand sets from all SUs, each SU calculates the
excess demand set and updates the prices by incrementing the
prices of the channels in excess demand by a factor α. Note
that only in case the demand set of an SU has changed it is
necessary that the SU broadcasts this update to the other SUs.
The choice of the price incrementing factor α for the prices
influences the speed of convergence of the algorithm. For
sufficiently small α, i.e., α → 0, Algorithm 4 converges to
the Walrasian equilibrium (Definition 5). For relatively large α,
some channels may not be demanded by any SUs. The reason
for this is that for a channel which has been demanded by more
than one SU, the price update of this channel does not take into
account the SUs’ utilities such that a high price incrementing
factor can make the channel suddenly unattractive to all SUs.
Algorithm 4 is guaranteed to converge since prices of the
channels can only be incremented and the SU utilities are
finite valued.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We assume an energy detector is used at each SU k
with a detection threshold γ[l]k . The false alarm probability
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(c) qk = L, ∀k ∈ K
Fig. 2: Comparison of stable matching and Walrasian equilib-
rium in the PU and SU sum rate regions for different quotas
at 0 dB SNR.
and probability of detection of the energy detector are re-
spectively approximated by f [l]k = Q
(
γ
[l]
k
−Nσ2
σ2
√
2N
)
and d[l]k =
Q
(
γ
[l]
k
−N(σ2+Pl|z[l]k |2)√
2Nσ2(σ2+2Pl|z[l]k |2)
)
[37]. We fix f [l]k = 0.05 and choose
N = 20 sensing observations. By calculating the threshold
γ
[l]
k , we can determine the detection probability. The probabil-
ity of primary transmission of all PUs is set to ϑ[l] = 0.75.
For simulations, we adopt the primary utility function φl to
be the average achievable rate:
φl(1− d[l]k , Pk|h˜[l]k |2) = ϑ[l]d[l]k log2
(
1 +
Pl|g[l]|2
σ2
)
+ ϑ[l](1− d[l]k ) log2
(
1 +
Pl|g[l]|2
σ2 + Pk|h˜[l]k |2
)
, (20)
and assume no specific QoS requirements of the PUs.
In Fig. 2, we plot the average performance region of the
primary (y-axis) and secondary systems (x-axis), where the
number of SUs is K = 10 and number of primary channels
is L = 20. All channels are independently and identically
Rayleigh distributed and the simulations are averaged over 103
random instances.
In Fig. 2, the region inside the quoted rate bound includes
only the performance of the SUs and PUs in the channels
in which the SUs are assigned to. This region is included in
the region marked as maximum rate bound which includes all
channel assignment possibilities to the SUs without quota re-
strictions. The quoted rate bound includes the stable matching
and Walrasian equilibrium channel assignments. We generate
both boundaries using the Hungarian optimization method [30]
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Fig. 3: Average sum-rate of the PUs for increasing SNR and
quotas qk = 2 for all k.
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Fig. 4: Average sum-rate of the SUs for increasing SNR and
quotas qk = 2 for all k.
which finds the optimal channel assignment by maximizing the
weighted sum rate of SUs and PUs in a centralized way, see
Section III.
In Fig. 2(a), we plot the performance of stable matching
following Algorithm 1 for qk = 1, for all k ∈ K. The outcome
favours the SUs and is near the quoted boundary showing
that the sum performance of the SUs from stable matching is
near optimal. Note, that in this setting not all channels can be
assigned to the SUs due to the quota restriction. In Fig. 2(b),
we set qk = 2, for all k ∈ K. In this setting, the outcomes of
stable matching do not reach the boundary but are closer to
it than the random matching scheme discussed further below.
Note, that our proposed quick terminating algorithm leads to
the best stable matching for the SUs but there may exist other
stable matchings. Nevertheless, our stable matching outcome
shows a fair trade-off in terms of giving an acceptable PU per-
formance. In Fig. 2(b), we also plot the Walrasian equilibrium
using Algorithm 4 with price incrementing factor α = 0.005
and weight λ = 0.5. By choosing λ = 0.5, we achieve in
Walrasian equilibrium the maximum sum performance of the
PUs and SUs in the quoted region. Note, that all points on the
boundary of the quoted region can be obtained as Walrasian
equilibria for different values of λ. In Fig. 2(c), the quotas
are specified such that any SU can be assigned all primary
channels. Following Theorem 1, the stable matching is unique
−20 −10 0 10 20 30
1
3
5
7
signal−to−noise ratio [dB]
av
g.
 n
um
be
r o
f p
ro
po
sa
ls 
pe
r S
U
 
 
q = L = 20
q = 2
q = 1
Fig. 5: Average number of proposals from each SU to the
coordinator for different quotas and increasing SNR occurring
during Algorithm 1.
and is sum-rate optimal in the quoted region.
In comparison to stable matching for different quota val-
ues in Fig. 2(a-c), random matching chosen to satisfy the
associated quota constraints does not show preference in
performance to neither PUs nor SUs. In our random matching
scheme, we first introduce qk-many virtual SUs with a quota
of one for each SU k ∈ K. Then, we apply random one-to-one
matching achieving a number of min(L,
∑
k∈K qk) matching
pairs.
A. Performance of Stable Matching
In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, the average sum rate of the PUs
and SUs are plotted respectively for increasing SNR and for
qk = 2, for all k ∈ K. The number of SUs is K = 10
and number of primary channels is L = 20. All channels
are independently and identically Rayleigh distributed and
we generate again 103 random instances for averaging in the
simulations. In Fig. 3, it is shown that the performance loss
of the PUs is very low in stable matching compared to the
setting without the operation of SUs. Hence, the coexistence
with the SUs does not lead to much performance degradations
to the PUs. In Fig. 4, the average sum rate of the SUs is
shown to be always larger with Algorithm 1 than with the
random matching scheme but does show a significant gap to
the maximum possible sum rate of the SUs. Note, that the
maximum SU sum rate is obtained at the point where the PU
sum rate is lowest which is an unsatisfying operating point for
a cognitive radio network, where primary user communication
is prioritized. Hence, the SU sum rate reached by stable
matching comes at an acceptable level. Since Algorithm 1
is SU-optimal, outcomes of other stable matching schemes
would perform worse for the SUs. At high SNR, the sum rate
performance of the SUs grows linearly. Note that in this SNR
regime the detection probability of each SU approaches zero
since the noise is much smaller compared to the primary signal
power. Accordingly, the achievable rate of an SU is not limited
by the interference from a PU.
In Fig. 5, the complexity of Algorithm 1 is revealed by
counting the number of matching proposals per secondary user
over SNR in the simulation scenario described above. The
average number of SU proposals increases for larger quotas
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Fig. 6: Average number of proposals by the SUs during
Algorithm 1 at 0 dB SNR. The number of PUs is double the
number of SUs, and the quotas of the SUs are equal to q.
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Fig. 7: Comparison of average number of demands per user
during Algorithm 4 and the average number of bids from the
distributed auction algorithm in [24] for different values of α
with L = K = 10 and qk = 1 for all k. SNR is 0 dB.
qk = q, for all k ∈ K. For qk = 1, for all k ∈ K, where the SUs
require only one channel, the stable matching algorithm tends
to match each SU with its first preference of the channels. Only
few re-matchings occur. Hence, a very low average number of
SU proposals (slightly above one) is needed for terminating
the protocol. Re-matchings occur when a user, engaged to a
channel, is released due to a proposal from another user which
gives the channel a higher utility. For large qk requirements,
frequent re-matchings lead to a much higher proposal number
in the presented stable matching algorithm. Generally however,
it is shown that only a few number of proposals are required
to reach a stable matching. In Fig. 6, the average number of
proposals during Algorithm 1 is plotted for increasing number
of SUs. The number of PU channels is set to be double
the number of SUs. It is shown that the average number of
proposals during the stable matching algorithm increases with
increasing quotas.
B. Performance of English Auction
In Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, we compare the average number of
demands/bids and the performance loss from optimal channel
assignment by Hungarian method approaches, respectively,
with respect to the price incrementing factor α used in
Algorithm 4 and also required in the distributed auction
mechanism in [24, Section IV]. Note that in [24, Section V],
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Fig. 8: Comparison of performance loss in outcome of Al-
gorithm 4 and the distributed auction algorithm in [24] for
different values of α with L = K = 10 and qk = 1 for all k.
SNR is 0 dB.
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Fig. 9: Comparison of average number of demands per user
required for the auction algorithms for different SNR values
with α = 0.01 and L = K = 10 and qk = 1 for all k.
an implementation of the distributed auction mechanism is
provided using opportunistic CSMA which needs no exchange
of information between the users. In order to compare the
performance to the algorithm in [24] which assigns a single
channel per user, we set qk = 1, for all k ∈ K and choose
L = K = 10. We average the performance at SNR = 0 dB
over 103 channel realizations. In Fig. 7, it can be seen that the
auction algorithm in [24] requires on average larger numbers
of bids per SU compared to the number of demands per user in
the English auction. However, according to Fig. 8, the English
auction is shown to be more sensitive over the choice of α. A
larger α increases the convergence rate of the English auction,
but leads to high performance loss. The low sensitivity of the
distributed auction in [24] to the price incrementing factor is
due to the fact that this auction method makes use of the prices
of both the best and second best object a user would demand
to determine his bid. This cannot be exploited in the English
auction since the demand of a user is a set of channels.
In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, we plot the average number of
demands and the SU sum rate for different SNR values. The
chosen price increment factor for the auction algorithms is
α = 0.01. It can be seen that the distributed auction requires
more average number of bids for larger SNR values than the
English auction requires number of demands. Both algorithms
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Fig. 10: Comparison of average SU sum rate for different SNR
values. The price incrementing factor α is 0.01 and L = K =
10 and qk = 1 for all k.
achieve very close performance to the optimum as is shown
in Fig. 10. The optimum is reached centralized by means of
the Hungarian method. Note that the performance loss of both
algorithms is due to the non-infinitesimal chosen value of the
price incrementing factor.
VII. CONCLUSION
We considered the problem of assigning primary channels
to SUs for communication in a cognitive radio. For this
problem, we proposed two solution concepts, stable matching
and Walrasian equilibrium, and provided coordination and
cooperation algorithms to reach them in a distributed manner.
Both concepts lead to different performances for the secondary
and primary users. We relate both solutions utilizing the
achievable sum performance regions. While stable matching
relies on stability of the assigned secondary and primary
users, the Walrasian equilibrium maximizes the weighted sum
utilities. In contrast to the stable matching framework, prices
are required in the competitive market model in order to define
the Walrasian equilibrium.
The complexity of SU-optimal stable matching algorithms
in terms of the average number of proposals is shown to
be very low by extensive simulation. The complexity of the
English auction to reach a Walrasian equilibrium depends,
however, on the choice of the price incrementing parameter.
Future works may devise a mechanism which adapts the price
incrementing parameter intelligently.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is based on the result in [38] (also given in
[7, Theorem 5.13]) which we restate here in relation to our
cognitive radio setting.
Theorem 5 ( [38]): Let k be a secondary user with quota
qk, and let M be a stable matching such that |M(k) ∩ L| < qk.
Then for any stable matching M ′, M ′(k) = M(k).
Thus, if a stable matching does not strictly satisfy the quota
of a secondary user with equality, then this user is assigned
the same set of primary channels in any other stable matching.
Since qk = L for all k ∈ K, and the existence of at least one
stable matching is guaranteed, then we can do the following
two-case study: 1) If |M(k)| < qk for all k ∈ K, then the
stable matching is unique Theorem 5 holds for all users. 2) If
|M(k)| = qk for some user k ∈ K then |M(j)| = 0 for all
j 6= k. Following Theorem 5 all users j 6= k are unmatched
in all other stable matchings. What is left is to consider
stable matchings in which the user k is assigned strictly less
channels than his quota. However, since a matching M ′, with
|M ′(k)| < qk is not individually rational for user k according
to Definition 2, then M ′ is not a stable matching. Hence, M
is unique.
Considering Algorithm 1, each SU k proposes to every
channel since his quota qk ≥ L. The coordinator then accepts
the proposal of an SU k in a channel l if he gives the
highest performance for PU l. Accordingly, the unique stable
matching is sum performance optimal for the PUs within the
performance region R˜pu defined in (9).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We have to show that the utility function in (13) satisfies
the monotonicity property and the gross substitutes condition.
The monotonicity property is obviously satisfied because if
additional channels are provided to an SU k, the utility Uk
in (13) does not decrease. In order to prove that the utility
function in (13) satisfies the gross substitutes condition, we
must first prove that
φk(B) = λusu-sumk (B) + (1 − λ)
∑
l∈B
upul (k), (21)
satisfies the gross substitute property. Afterwards, the op-
eration in (13) on φk(B) is called the qk-satiation of φk
and preserves the gross substitutes property according to [25,
Section 2]. The function φk(B) satisfies the gross substitutes
property because it is additively separable [25, Section 2], i.e.,
φk(B) in (21) can be expressed as φk(B) =
∑
l∈B φk({l}).
C. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is by contradiction. Given pl > 0 for all l ∈ L,
assume for some SU k a demand set A ∈ Dk(p) satisfies
|A| > qk. Then, according to his utility function in (13), a set
of channels R ⊂ A with |R| ≥ |A| − qk give no additional
performance to SU k since the maximization in (13) is over
at most qk channels and we can write Uk(A) = Uk(A \ R).
The net utility of SU k in (14) satisfies
vk(A,p) = Uk(A)−
∑
l∈A
pl (22a)
= Uk(A \R)−
∑
l∈A\R
pl −
∑
l′∈R
pl′ (22b)
= vk(A \R,p)−
∑
l′∈R
pl′ . (22c)
Hence, vk(A,p) < vk(A \ R,p) which contradicts that A is
a demand for SU k.
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D. Proof of Theorem 3
The consumer utility function in (13) is proven in Theorem
2 to satisfy the gross substitutes condition. We will use an
equivalent property to the gross substitutes condition called
the single improvement property [25] in the proof.
Definition 6: The utility function Uk(A) satisfies the single
improvement property if for any price vector p and set of
channels A 6= Dk(p), i.e., A is not a demand set for SU k,
there exists another set B such that vk(A,p) < vk(B,p) with
either |A \ B| ≤ 1, or |B \ A| ≤ 1.
Let Ak be the output of Algorithm 2 and assume Ak
is not a demand set, i.e., Ak /∈ Dk(p). Then in order to
strictly improve vk(Ak,p) we can, according to the single
improvement property in Definition 6, do either of three
possibilities:
(i) adding an element to Ak, i.e., find a ∈ L \ Ak s.t.
vk(Ak ∪ {a},p) > vk(Ak,p)
(ii) removing one element from Ak , i.e., find b ∈ L\Ak
s.t. vk(Ak \ {b},p) > vk(Ak,p)
(iii) or do both (i) and (ii).
Case (i): If |Ak| = qk, then adding an element a ∈ L \ Ak
requires removing another element b ∈ Ak following Lemma
1. Since the elements in Ak are the first qk best channels, then
removing one element to add the element a does not lead to
strict performance improvement having that the net utilities
in the resources are distinct according to Assumption 1. If
|Ak| < qk, then the net utility with channel a ∈ L \ Ak is
nonpositive, i.e., vk(a, pa) ≤ 0 because otherwise it would
be a member of Ak from Algorithm 2. Hence, no strict
performance improvement can be made by adding an element
to Ak.
Case (ii): Since vk(b, pb) > 0 for all b ∈ Ak, then removing
one element from Ak leads to strict performance degradation.
Since both (i) and (ii) lead to no strict performance im-
provement, then (iii) cannot be satisfied. Accordingly, Ak is a
demand set, i.e., belongs to the set Dk(p). From (ii), the Ak
is the smallest demand set in Dk(p) and is contained in other
demand sets in Dk(p). Specifically, another demand set can
be constructed from Ak when |Ak| < qk by adding a resource
l ∈ L \ Ak to Ak which satisfies vk({l},p) = 0.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
Following Theorem 3, the demand is the smallest element
in Dk(p) in (15). Then, for an SU k, the intersection of his
demand set Ak from Algorithm 2 with the aggregate excess
demand Z from Algorithm 3 is smallest compared to other
demand sets in Dk(p).
First, we prove that Z belongs to the set O(p) in (18). That
is, we must prove:
(i) KK(Z,p) − |Z| = KK(Z ∪ {a},p) − |Z ∪ {a}|,
a ∈ L \ Z
(ii) KK(Z,p)−|Z| > KK(Z\{b},p)−|Z \ {b}|, b ∈ Z .
In order to prove (i), let the element a ∈ L\Z be demanded by
SU j only, i.e., a ∈ Aj . Note, that if channel a is demanded
by more than two SUs, then it would belong to the set Z
according to Algorithm 3. Then we can write
KK(Z ∪ {a},p)− |Z ∪ {a}| (23a)
=
∑K
k=1
|Ak ∩ Z ∪ {a}| − |Z ∪ {a}| (23b)
=
∑K
k=1,k 6=j |Ak ∩ Z|+ |Aj ∩ Z ∪ {a}| − |Z| − 1 (23c)
=
∑K
k=1,k 6=j
|Ak ∩ Z|+ |Aj ∩ Z|+ 1− |Z| − 1 (23d)
=
∑K
k=1
|Ak ∩ Z| − |Z|. (23e)
In order to prove (ii), let b ∈ Z be demanded by SUs j and
ℓ, i.e., b ∈ Aj and b ∈ Aℓ. Then,
KK(Z,p)− |Z| =
K∑
k=1
|Ak ∩ Z| − |Z| (24a)
=
K∑
k=1
k/∈{j,ℓ}
|Ak ∩ Z|+ |Aj ∩ Z|+ |Aℓ ∩ Z| − |Z| (24b)
=
∑K
k=1,k/∈{j,ℓ} |Ak ∩ Z \ {b}|+ |Aj ∩ Z \ {b}|
+ |Aℓ ∩ Z \ {b}|+ 2− |Z \ {b}| − 1 (24c)
=
∑K
k=1
|Ak ∩ Z \ {b}| − |Z \ {b}|+ 1 (24d)
> KK(Z \ {b},p)− |Z \ {b}|. (24e)
Thus, Z ∈ O(p) and from (ii), Z is the smallest element in
O(p).
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